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Law in the twilight of environmental
Armageddon
A response to Han Somsen*
Luigi Corrias
Han Somsen has written the kind of text that gives food for thought. It is rich in
new and daring ideas. Since I am by no means an expert in environmental law,
nor in applied ethics, in my response I would like to focus on some legal philoso-
phical issues that are provoked by his paper. I will first address the problem of the
relationship between effectiveness and legitimacy. Then, I will briefly look into
the issue of regulation by code. Finally, I will make some remarks on geo-enginee-
ring and its underlying rationality.
Somsen maintains that an ecological catastrophe confronts law and lawyers with
two major challenges. The first challenge concerns effectiveness: is there regula-
tion that is fit for the purpose of dealing with the catastrophe? The second chal-
lenge regards legitimacy: is this regulation the right thing to do and is it the right
way of doing it? The important theoretical issue here is how these two challenges
are related. Somsen connects a catastrophe with the setting aside of constitutio-
nal values, in the sense that ‘environmental regulatory priorities will be shifting
towards effectiveness, directly at the expense of legitimacy’.1
While Somsen thus seems to suggest that legitimacy is simply sacrificed for the
sake of effectiveness, I doubt whether this is actually the way in which the argu-
ment goes. It seems to me that here the concept of catastrophe invites the same
type of reasoning as the notion of the sovereign decision on the exception. As
Schmitt has famously made clear, the exception
‘is truly a matter of extreme emergency and how it is to be eliminated. (…) He
[i.e. the sovereign, LC] decides whether there is an extreme emergency as well
as what must be done to eliminate it. Although he stands outside the nor-
mally valid legal system, he nevertheless belongs to it, for it is he who must
decide whether the constitution needs to be suspended in its entirety’.2
* This is a revised version of a text presented at the Conference ‘Necessity, Exception, Catastrophe:
Shifts in Legal and Political Theory’, held at VU University Amsterdam on 28 April 2010. I am
grateful to the organizers for their invitation to participate. I would also like to thank Bart van
Klink and the referees of this journal for their helpful comments on an earlier version of this
article. Of course, all remaining mistakes are entirely my responsibility.
1 Somsen, in this issue, section 2.
2 Carl Schmitt, Political Theology: Four Chapters On The Concept Of Sovereignty, trans. and ed.
George Schwab (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1985), 7.
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The paradox here is that in the sovereign decision the constitution is suspended
for the sake of that very constitution. Now, does not the same type of reasoning
underpin Somsen’s article, in particular his thoughts on the relationship between
legitimacy and effectiveness? Indeed, legitimacy and effectiveness are bound to
one another in a paradoxical way: it is legitimate to suspend the constitutional
values of a legal order for the sake of the ultimate effectiveness of those very
values. The emphasis on effectiveness is justified by the exceptionally bad state of
the environment and immediately legitimized as necessary in order to uphold the
existence of the legal order. Thus, the paradox may be formulated as follows: To
secure legitimacy for the future, it is legitimate to make use of exceptional, non-
legitimate and extremely effective measures. Somsen explicitly distances himself
from what he labels ‘cynical constructions’ of ‘fake-catastrophes’ in the key of
‘states of emergency’ or ‘states of exception’.3 To him, the dangers of internatio-
nal terrorism provide one example of such a cynical construction. Yet, at the same
time, his way of reasoning remains similar to these constructions. As a result,
while Somsen himself refers to the way in which an environmental catastrophe
will lead to an emphasis on effectiveness at the expense of legitimacy, he never-
theless seems to be unaware of the exact structure of his own argument. Given
that his reasoning is basically the same as that used for states of emergency or
exception, he should at least explain in which regard the case of an environmental
catastrophe differs from these ‘cynical constructions’ if he wants to avoid the
reproach of making use of a ‘cynical construction’ himself.
A second theoretically interesting issue is regulation by code. To explain this
point, we should shift our attention to Somsen’s use of Jonas’ version of the cate-
gorical imperative. Famously, Hans Jonas pointed to the inability of old ethical
theories to provide guidance in our present ‘Technological Age’. Hence, his re-
formulation of Kant’s categorical imperative: ‘Act so that the effects of your
action are compatible with the permanence of genuine human life.’4 Somsen is
keen to stress that ‘human life’ implies a life in which rights are respected.5 With
Jonas, Somsen trades law for ethics and uses undeniably powerful technologies as
an enforcement mechanism. This move to ethics is needed to ‘help clear the legiti-
macy hurdles that currently limit the options of environmental regulators’.6
When it comes to environmental catastrophes,
‘[r]egulators that are not hindered by procedural or institutional legitimacy
requirements, or in any event are not hindered by them to the same extent,
will increasingly turn under such circumstances towards technologies as a
regulatory instrument (“techno-regulation” or “code”), instead of or in con-
junction with “law”, self-regulation, or “market-mechanisms”.’7
3 Somsen, in this issue, section 1.
4 Hans Jonas, The Imperative of Responsibility: In Search of an Ethics for the Technological Age, trans.
Hans Jonas with David Herr (Chicago and London: The University of Chicago Press, 1984), 11.
5 Somsen, in this issue, section 2.
6 Ibid., section 2.
7 Ibid., section 3.
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Somsen himself points to the risks of this approach:
‘constitutional values are set aside, or at the very least are substantially ero-
ded to do justice to new ecological realities, in the same way that the 9/11
attacks have paved the way for national security measures that would have
been unimaginable prior to that event. Put differently, environmental regula-
tory priorities will be shifting towards effectiveness, directly at the expense of
legitimacy.’8
Also here, Somsen’s argument is more subtle than he himself seems to think: his
appeal to Jonas is not simply a choice for effectiveness and against legitimacy.
Ethics is called upon to legitimize the use of technology, because technology is
more effective than law in dealing with an environmental catastrophe. In other
words, in his attempt to think radically, Somsen abandons law for a discourse
based on ethics and technology. While he notices the risks, he still thinks that the
dawning catastrophe justifies the use of techno-regulation.
I would like to call attention to one of the claims techno-regulation makes. Call to
mind the end of the quote of Lawrence Lessig, as it appears in Somsen’s paper:
‘Code is an efficient means of regulation. But its perfection makes it some-
thing different. (…) In the well implemented system, there is no civil dis-
obedience. Law as code is a start to the perfect technology of justice.’9
While Somsen admits that we have moved away from the legal domain, with Les-
sig he seems to claim that justice may still be done. Yet, is code really able to bring
us justice? The binary logic in which law works implies that giving up civil dis-
obedience means that there can be no civil obedience either. What remains is
behaviour in accordance with code, but since the subjects have not deliberately
made the decision to behave in accordance with a law it is impossible to speak of
civil obedience. What this ultimately entails, I think, is that we may no longer
speak of citizens as legal subjects in the sense of bearers of legal rights and duties.
What else is civil obedience than a legal subject’s decision to follow the rule? Now,
this rule-following presupposes a fundamental sort of agency involved in law.
Without this agency there can be no law and no civil obedience.10 Thus, without
this agency there are also no citizens. This has direct consequences for justice.
Justice (in the classical sense of ‘giving each his due’) involves a necessary
moment of in- and exclusion to determine who is entitled to get something and
who is not, a necessary moment of drawing the boundaries between citizens and
non-citizens. Indeed, justice cannot be done without determining who are citi-
8 Ibid., section 2.
9 Ibid., section 3.
10 Cf. Lon L. Fuller, The Morality of Law: Revised Edition (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1969),
162: ‘To embark on the enterprise of subjecting human conduct to the governance of rules invol-
ves of necessity a commitment to the view that man is, or can become, a responsible agent, capa-
ble of understanding and following rules, and answerable for his defaults.’
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zens.11 In other words, without civil disobedience there can be no civil obedience
and thus no citizens but then ultimately no justice either. Technology may bring
us order, but only the kind of order that encompasses everything and cannot dis-
tribute anything. Replacing law by code means giving up justice completely.12
One last issue remains to be addressed. In the third part of the paper, geo-engi-
neering is introduced together with the precautionary principle. Geo-engineering
is treated as an ‘apocalyptic’ type of technology. Notwithstanding its high risks
(most importantly because of a lack of scientific knowledge regarding the exact
consequences), Somsen argues in favour of this type of technology because it also
promises huge benefits. In this regard, the value of the precautionary principle
‘resides in its enabling nature: it allows regulators to take preventive action to
avoid threats of serious or irreversible damage in cases where they otherwise
could not do so.’13
The cost-benefit analysis thus seems to point in favour of the use of new techno-
logies. Yet there is still something in the background of this argument that does
not entirely convince me.
My first problem concerns the lack of argumentation in this crucial part of Som-
sen’s article. In his thought experiment he stipulates that there is a consensus on
the view that we are on the brink of environmental catastrophe, and from this
factual assumption he pleads for extremely far-ranging normative measures. His
argument seems to be built completely on the precautionary principle. Is this not
too shallow a ground? While I can see why Somsen relies on this principle, I am
not convinced that it is enough. The enabling character of the principle might say
that measures may be taken, it remains silent on the question why measures
should be taken, which measures, when and how. Telling in this regard is the nega-
tive formulation of the precautionary principle in the Rio Declaration.14 While
scientific uncertainty may not be used as a reason to postpone action, I do not see
why it would unequivocally legitimize the use of geo-engineering technologies. In
any case, the fact of impending environmental Armageddon does not immediately
bring us to the conclusion that
‘[r]egulators will then rightfully argue that the fact that uncertainties remain
about the potential risks of intervening in the climate is not a reason to delay
action.’15
11 In this sense, see also: Bert van Roermund, Law, Narrative and Reality: An Essay in Intercepting
Politics (Dordrecht: Kluwer, 1997), 151 and (more specifically on the theme of legal space) Hans
Lindahl, ‘Give and Take: Arendt and the Nomos of Political Community,’ Philosophy and Social
Criticism 32 (2006): 881.
12 For a similar argument, see: Mireille Hildebrandt, ‘Juridische bescherming “by design”?’ Neder-
lands Tijdschrift voor Rechtsfilosofie & Rechtstheorie 39 (2010): 101.
13 Somsen, in this issue, section 4.
14 Quoted by Somsen, in this issue, section 4.
15 Somsen, in this issue, section 4. My italics, LC.
Rechtsfilosofie & Rechtstheorie 2011 (40) 1 61
Dit artikel van BJu Tijdschriften is gemaakt voor Vrije Universiteit 180209
Luigi Corrias
The historical evidence that regulators actually do argue in this way (including the
dangerous example of the Hiroshima bomb) does not suffice.
Let me, secondly, take a closer look at some of the consequences Somsen’s ideas
might have. At the very end of his paper he states:
‘that such systematic recourse to environmental techno-regulation invites a
range of fundamental legal and ethical questions. When such questions arise
in the context of an impending catastrophe, as the example of the war on ter-
rorism clearly suggests, fundamental principles that discipline environmental
regulators and bestow legitimacy on their actions will prove “fundamen-
tal’”only up to a point.’16
The problem with these lines is that it remains rather vague what Somsen means
by ‘fundamental principles’. However, since he links them with the task of disci-
plining regulators, I assume he is speaking of constitutional values aimed at limi-
ting the power of those who may set binding rules. In that case, this argument
puts at risk far more than it may solve. With this kind of reasoning a future may
definitely be saved, but what kind of future? The price to be paid for the survival
of the legal order for future generations seems to be no legal order for future gene-
rations. A society where fundamental principles are beforehand ‘“fundamental”
only up to a point’ may certainly not count as a legal order. Order might be the
first of law’s tasks, but it is certainly not the only one. Order under the rule of law
entails a society where order is always subordinate to freedom. Now, fundamental
principles are exactly what ensures these freedoms.17 Of course, there may always
be a situation in which even fundamental values may be infringed. Yet, as is now
the case, every infringement should meet some hard conditions that may be tes-
ted in court. Somsen seems to give carte blanche to infringements of fundamental
values in the name of future generations. Surprisingly, here he even approvingly
refers to the war on terrorism which he seems to have discarded earlier as a ‘fake-
catastrophe’ construed by ‘cynical regulators’. To me, a future where fundamental
values are in constant jeopardy of being sacrificed for the sake of future generati-
ons sounds like a future that ought never to become a present.
I come now to my third problem with geo-engineering. This problem precedes the
questions taken up by a cost-benefit analysis. It concerns the way of thinking that
seems to hide in the very concept of geo-engineering. Indeed, the very notion
involves an amount of hubris that invokes the images of Daedalus (also an engi-
neer!) and his poor son Icarus. Mythology aside, geo-engineering seems to regard
the Earth as a globe, as an object or artefact that may be adjusted to meet the wis-
hes of mankind. At least, that is how direct human intervention changing the
conditions of oceans, atmosphere and stratosphere with the sole purpose of redu-
16 Somsen, in this issue, section 5.
17 I base this argument on the well-known legal philosophy of Gustav Radbruch, see Gustav Rad-
bruch, ‘Legal Philosophy,’ in The Legal Philosophies of Lask, Radbruch, and Dabin, trans. and ed.
Kurt Wilk (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1950), 43.
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cing the effects of climate change strikes me. Is this type of instrumental rationa-
lity not exactly the one that has led us to the present apocalyptic state? If we are
to take seriously the plea for an ethics for times of environmental Armageddon, it
should certainly take leave from the type of anthropocentric and technological
rationality that lies at the very root of the problem.
Instead of taking refuge in a ‘techno-logos’, a mode of thinking still indebted to a
Cartesian ontology of dichotomies such as subject and object, mind and body,
human and environment, what is needed is what I would like to call an ‘eco-logos’.
This entails a mode of rationality that puts nature at the centre and takes our
incarnated being as rooted in the earth seriously. A phenomenological understan-
ding of the relationship between man and world may form the starting point for
developing such a rationality.18 What is at stake in an environmental catastrophe
is not the world as an artefact (a globe) that we might adjust as if we were its mas-
ters, but rather the world as a ‘lived world’. The world is not simply what opposes
us, or what surrounds us (the literal meaning of ‘environment’), but as human
beings we are ‘in the world’ in the sense that we are directed towards the world,
are part of it, and have a relationship with the world. Eco-logos thus encompasses
a kind of thinking that understands our Earth as the place of our dwelling, the
horizon that makes all our activity possible. This rationality should be the star-
ting point from which new norms could be established.19 I admit that my
approach is much closer to the status quo than the one advocated by Somsen.
However, I would rather be cautious with putting all our hopes on technology.
What might save us at the end of the day is a durable change in behaviour that
finds its origin not first and foremost in the impossibility of doing the wrong
thing but in the acknowledgement that there lies a fundamental non-mastery at
the root of our mastery. From this perspective, the interests of the environment
may appear as our own interests.
18 For more on this theme, especially in the field of legal philosophy, see: Luigi Corrias, The Passivity
of Law (PhD diss., Tilburg University, 2010), chapters III and IV. A revised edition of this book
will be forthcoming at Springer in 2011.
19 I am by no means claiming that such a notion of rationality would immediately and unequivo-
cally point to new legal norms. A lot of legal and philosophical work needs to be done in order to
get to the concrete level of norms. This is not the place to elaborate on this, yet I do believe that
another way of dealing with the ecological problems ahead of us should start with rethinking
rationality.
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